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Toward a Clarification of the "Arising
Under" Clause of the United States
Constitution: A Revival of the Osborn Test
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria
103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
On April 21, 1975, the Republic of Nigeria contracted to
purchase 240,000 tons of cement for a total contract price of
$14,400,000 from Verlinden, B.V., a Dutch corporation with its
principal place of business in Amsterdam, Netherlands. The con-
tract was to be financed through an irrevocable, divisible and con-
firmed letter of credit in favor of Verlinden.
Verlinden brought suit against the Central Bank of Nigeria, as
an instrumentality of the Nigerian government, in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York for
anticipatory breach of the letter of credit. Jurisdiction was based
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).1 The
Central Bank moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction. On April 21, 1980, the District Court
held that, under the FSIA, foreign plaintiffs were permitted to sue
a foreign state or its instrumentality in the federal courts, but dis-
missed the suit because the transaction involving the letter of
credit was not a sufficient contact with the United States as re-
quired by the FSIA.2 Verlinden appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which af-
firmed the dismissal on other grounds.5 It held that the FSIA ex-
ceeded the scope of article III of the Constitution because neither
the "diversity"" nor the "arising under" clauses were broad
enough to support jurisdiction between a citizen of a foreign state
and a foreign sovereign based on a non-federal cause of action. Af-
ter the decision was announced, the United States moved for leave
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891-98, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(a)(4), 1391(f),
1441(d) and 1602-1611 (1976).
2. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
3. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1981). The appeals
court had jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
5. Id.
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to intervene and for rehearing on the grounds that the court of
appeals had not complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2403.6 This motion was
denied without explanation. Upon application by Verlinden to the
Supreme Court, a writ of certiorari was granted. 7 The Court re-
versed and remanded, held: (1) The FSIA codifies, as a matter of
federal law, the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity;
(2) Under section 1330(a) of the FSIA, a foreign plaintiff may sue a
foreign sovereign in the United States courts; (3) Congress did not
exceed the scope of article III by granting federal district courts
original jurisdiction over certain suits by foreign plaintiffs against
foreign sovereigns, where the rule of decision is to be provided by
non-federal law.$ Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103
S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
Under its contract with Verlinden, the Nigerian government
had agreed to establish a letter of credit through the Slavenburg's
Bank, Amsterdam, Netherlands. The letter was established as
agreed in favor of Verlinden for the contract amount, except that
the letter was made payable through the Morgan Guaranty Bank
in New York rather than Slavenburg's Bank.9 Verlinden contended
this to be in contradiction to the agreement and that the letter of
credit was at variance with the contract in that it was unconfirmed
and not divisible and, therefore, commercially ineffective and
unusable."0
The contract between Verlinden and the Republic of Nigeria
provided for monthly shipments of 20,000 metric tons of cement,
commencing forty-five days after receipt of the letter of credit. De-
murrage" was to be paid at a maximum of $3,500 per day per yes-
6. Section 2403 provides that in any action in which the constitutionality of an act of
Congress affecting the public interest is drawn into question that the court should notify the
Attorney General.
7. Verlinden B.V, v. Central National Bank of Nigeria, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982).
8. The court of appeals notes that the law governing the suit is the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits of the International Chamber of Commerce or the
law of New York. The Supreme Court does not determine which choice of law would apply,
only that non-federal law would be applicable.
9. Morgan Guaranty acted as an advising bank and took no independent responsibility
for guarantying the letter of credit.
10. During the course of their dealings, the Central Bank issued amendments to the
letter of credit attempting to render it consistent with the contract, but as to which the
plaintiff was not advised until September 1975. The letter of credit, therefore, was never
confirmed. Morgan Guaranty was prepared to confirm the letter but awaited the payment of
confirmation charges by Verlinden.
11. Demurrage is a type of extended freight or stipulated damages which is paid by the
receiver for delays in loading or unloading cargo.
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sel if the discharge of cargo was not completed at a rate of at least
1,000 tons per day as of the first day after a vessel's arrival in La-
gos Apapa, the port of Nigeria. The letter of credit was inconsis-
tent in this regard in that it did not indicate when demurrage pay-
ments would commence.
In addition to the contract with Verlinden, Nigeria had con-
tracted to purchase cement from more than sixty-eight other sup-
pliers on 109 contracts. The result of this ambitious development
program by the Nigerian government was a bottleneck of ships in
the ports of Nigeria. 2 In order to protect its own interests, the
Central Bank, in mid-September 1975, directed its correspondent
bank, Morgan Guaranty, to adopt certain amendments to all their
outstanding irrevocable letters of credit in connection with cement
contracts. Under these amendments, demurrage payments would
be stopped unless certified by the Central Bank. The only circum-
stance under which these payments would be certified was if the
shipments were cleared with the Bank two months prior to their
arrival in Nigerian waters. 18 These amendments were unilaterally
adopted by the Bank without the consent of Verlinden."
Based on the issuance of the letter of credit, Verlinden, in Au-
gust of 1975, had subcontracted with another European concern,
Interbuco Anstalt of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, for the purchase of ce-
ment.'5 It was Verlinden's position that the Central Bank could be
held responsible, due to its breach, for liquidated damages under
the subcontract with Interbuco. Verlinden brought suit seeking
$4,660,000 in damages for payments already made and/or owing to
Interbuco, lost profits from the contract with Nigeria, and counsel
fees and expenses. Verlinden also sought punitive damages in a
like amount.
Since the signing of the Constitution, there has been much
12. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2nd Cir. 1981); and Direct Financial Effect under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
14 LAw. AM. 2, 361-66 (1982).
13. Under the terms of the contract between Verlinden and Nigeria, the contract was to
be governed by the laws of the Netherlands, and disputes were to be resolved by arbitration
before the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France.
14. These unilateral amendments made by the Central Bank through Morgan were in
violation of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, stipulated to be
followed under the contract. The Uniform Customs and Practice allows for amendments
only by the agreement of all parties concerned. The International Chamber of Commerce
Brochure No. 222 (1962 Rev.), art. 3.
15. 488 F. Supp. at 1288.
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confusion among legal scholars, lawyers and judges regarding the
proper scope of the "arising under" clause. 6 This note will articu-
late the state of the law concerning the scope of this clause in light
of this case. In so doing, it will be necessary to first consider and
elaborate on the history and content of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, as does the Court. This note will only briefly discuss
the ancillary holdings in the case.
History of Foreign. Sovereign Immunity in the United States
In its opinion, 17 the Supreme Court relied on the leading case
of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon'e for the origin of the de-
velopment of absolute foreign sovereign immunity in this country.
In that case, an American sought to claim title to an armed vessel
of France within a United States port.1 ' In deciding whether juris-
diction would lie against the foreign sovereign, Chief Justice Mar-
shall reasoned that, although the jurisdiction of the United States
or any nation within its own territory is exclusive, implicit in our
consent to allow a foreign sovereign to enter this country is a
waiver of such jurisdiction, unless withdrawn by the legislature or
executive.3 0 The policy behind granting such a waiver would be the
promotion of intercourse betwpen foreign nations and the preser-
vation of their dignity.
The Verlinden Court noted that foreign sovereign immunity,
as made clear by The Schooner Exchange, is a matter of grace and
comity within the courts' authority. The courts could defer to the
political branches to determine whether they should take jurisdic-
tion of a particular case without violating the Constitution. This
practice was firmly established by the 1940's." In Ex parte Repub-
lic of Peru,2 the Court held that, in the absence of a determina-
16. The "arising under" clause of theConstitution provides: "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ......
17. Chief Justice Burger delivered. the opinion of the Court. There was no dissenting
opinion.
18. 7 CRANCH 116, (1812).
19. It was alleged that the vessel, while sailing from Baltimore to St. Sebastians in
Spain, was violently and forcibly takenby persons acting under the decrees of Napoleon,
the Emperor of France. Id.
20. "A foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdic-
tion incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity of his nation, and it is to avoid this
subjection that the license [to enter the country] has been obtained." Id. at 137.
21. 103 S. Ct. at 1967-68.
22. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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tion by the State Department, the district court would have juris-
diction to decide whether the vessel seized was of a character
subject to immunity. However, the Court held, in accordance with
well-established principles, that the exercise of such jurisdiction,
where the State Department had recognized the claim of immu-
nity, would embarrass the executive branch in its conduct of for-
eign affairs.'8 As in The Schooner Exchange, the Court viewed the
judicial seizure of a ship belonging to a foreign sovereign as a seri-
ous challenge to the dignity of the foreign sovereign, affecting our
friendly relations with that nation. Therefore, the Court in Ex
parte Peru" placed a requirement on the judiciary to accept and
follow the executive determinations in matters of sovereign
immunity.
Immunity was not granted by the Court in Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman,26 where a ship was owned but not operated by a for-
eign sovereign. Although the State Department had not made a
determination in that case, it was held that the courts were re-
stricted in their determination to follow the established policy of
the department. "The courts [were not] to deny an immunity
which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immu-
nity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize.1''26
The practice by most nations at this time was to limit their
power to subject foreign states to judicial process for public non-
commercial acts, but otherwise to permit suit. The American stan-
dard was broader; the State Department ordinarily requested im-
munity in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns.'7 Then in
1952, the State Department issued the Tate letter"8 announcing its
change in policy and adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, which was more consistent with international practice.
Under the restrictive theory, immunity is confined to the strictly
public acts of a sovereign, acta jus imperii, and does not extend to
its commercial acts, acta jus gestionis. According to the Tate let-
ter, whether or not a sovereign was immune from liability de-
pended on the nature of its activity and not its purpose or
23. Id. at 586-90.
24. Id.
25. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
26. Id. at 35.
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1968.
28. The "Tate Letter" by Acting Legal Advier Jack B. Tate of May 19, 1952, 26 State




The State Department continued to remain involved and
would from time to time issue its suggestions of immunity. Two
bodies of law eventually developed; that of the State Department
and that of judicial precedent."0 In essence, the foreign sovereign
was able to choose the forum, either by seeking a suggestion of
immunity from the State Department or by relying on the case law
of the particular court which had jurisdiction. The courts at-
tempted to grant immunity based on established principles, while
the State Department often granted immunity for political consid-
erations in difficult situations.3 ' The Verlinden Court noted that
State Department decisions were inconsistent and frequently
granted immunity when not required by the restrictive theory and
in general were less impartial than court decisions would have
been.32 Thus, the courts' deference to the State Department fre-
quently resulted in an embarrassment to the executive."3
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, the FSIA was passed. For the most part, the FSIA
codified as a matter of federal law the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity as announced in the Tate letter.3 4 The act with-
draws the need for State Department involvement, except in ex-
ceptional situations,"5 and provides a uniform standard, not
subject to case-by-case diplomatic pressures. 3
The Court in Verlinden concerned itself with the provisions
and operation of the FSIA, which it considered to be, and repeat-
edly referred to, as a complex substantive statute.37 Under the
29. Id.
30. Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and
Effect, 3 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD., 1, 6-7, 34-39 (1976).
31. See id. at 15, 38-42, for a discussion on the difficulty in following State Department
decisions which were frequently rendered with no reasons given other than the single state-
ment quoted from the Tate Letter: "According to the newer or restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or pub-
lic acts (juri imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (juri gestionis)."
32. 103 S. Ct. at 1967-68.
33. See Weber supra note 30 at 40-42.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 1968.
35. Weber, supra note 30 at 46-48. The State Department can still exercise its inherent
foreign policy power to prevent any judicial antagonism.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 1968. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEws 6604.
37. Throughout the opinion, the Court refers to FSIA as a substantive statute. See 103
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FSIA, a foreign sovereign is immune from liability unless an excep-
tion to immunity is met under the Act, including an express or
implied waiver of immunity by the foreign sovereign.
Section 1330 of the FSIA provides for original jurisdiction in
the district courts, without regard to the amount in controversy, of
any non-jury civil action against a foreign state (as defined by sec-
tion 1603(a) of the Act). The Court, quoting from the House Re-
port on the Act, noted that the lack of an amount in controversy
contributes to the purpose of Congress by encouraging suits to be
brought in the federal courts."s Congress, however, did not make
jurisdiction exclusive." Under this section, subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction 0 apply in all actions against a foreign state, not
entitled to immunity under international agreement or under sec-
tions 1605 and 1607 of the FSIA. Additionally, this section pro-
vides that personal jurisdiction over a foreign state be made by
service as described in section 1608 of the Act."
Section 1332 (a)(2)-(3) of the Diversity of Citizenship Statute
is amended by the Act to delete references to "foreign states" since
section 1330 now includes such jurisdiction without regard to an
amount in controversy. 2
Section 1391 of the FSIA provides the methods by which
venue may by obtained.
Section 1441, the removal provision, significantly contributes
to the consolidation of actions under the FSIA in federal court by
providing for removal of any civil action brought in state court
against a foreign state, as defined in the Act.'8
The intent and purposes of Congress in enacting the FSIA are
S. Ct. at 1965, 1967 (n.5), 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, for numerous references to it as a substan-
tive statute.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 1969, n. 13.
39. It is probable that Congress had doubts as to the constitutionality of the Act when
basing jurisdiction on the "arising under" clause in such a situation as presented here and
provided for concurrent jurisdiction in the event that this portion of the Act was found
unconstitutional. If its intent were to consolidate actions in the federal courts, it would ap-
pear that exclusive jurisdiction might have better served this goal in the rare situation that
the defendant did not remove the action.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 1967, n.5.
41. This, in effect, is a federal long-arm provision modeled after the long-arm statute
enacted for the District of Columbia. H.R. REP. No. 94-1437, 7 (1976).
42. The Act also adds sub-paragraph (4) to section 1332(a) so as to continue to provide
for jurisdiction on the basis of diversity between a foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of
one or more states of the United States, subject to the $10,000 amount in controversy.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 1969.
19841
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stated in section 1602. One purpose is to serve the interest of jus-
tice and protect the rights of foreign states and other litigants by
providing jurisdiction in the federal courts. Another purpose of the
Act is to provide for uniform decisions in the federal and state
courts." Additionally, this section notes that, in accordance with
international law, foreign states may be subjected to liability for
their commercial activities and that their commercial property
may be levied upon in satisfaction of judgments in connection with
such activities.'
Section 1603 provides important definitions for certain terms
of the FSIA, including that of a "foreign state" and an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.' ' " In order to determine if the
Central Bank of Nigeria qualified as an agency or instrumentality,
definitions of this section would necessarily be applied. This sec-
tion also defines "commercial activity," a crucial definition in any
application of the FSIA. Consistent with the Tate letter, the com-
mercial character of an activity is to be determined by the courts
based on the nature of the conduct or transaction and not its pur-
pose ' 7 Another important term, a "commercial activity carried on
in the United States by a foreign state," is defined to require that
the commercial activity have substantial contact with the United
States.
Section 1604, partially reiterating section 1330 of the Act,
makes foreign states immune from suit in the federal and state
courts, unless one of the exceptions under the general exceptions of
sections 1605 and 1607 are met. Exceptions to immunity included
in section 1605 are, inter alia, implicit or explicit waiver by a for-
eign state of its immunity; actions based upon the commercial ac-
tivity of a foreign state carried on in the United States or causing a
direct effect in the United States; actions concerning rights in
property allegedly taken in violation of international law, where
the property is in the United States in connection with a commer-
44. See H.R. Rap. No. 94-1487, at 32, discussing the importance of developing a uni-
form body of law.
45. "Finally, current standards of international law concerning sovereign immunity add
content to the 'commercial activity' phrase of the FSIA. Section 1602 of the Act, entitled
'Findings and Declaration of Purpose,' contains a cryptic reference to international law, but
fails wholly to adopt it." Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300, 310 (2nd Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted).
46. The Court must interpret this section of the Act to determine if the Central Bank
qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.
47. Much latitude is left to the courts to determine whether an activity qualifies as a
"commercial activity" under the FSIA. H.R. RRP. No. 94-1487, at 16.
[Vol. 16:1
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cial activity; actions involving rights in property in the United
States acquired by inheritance or gift or rights in real estate lo-
cated in the United States; actions for certain torts committed
within the United States; and certain actions in admiralty involv-
ing maritime liens on vessels or cargo. Section 1607 provides an
exception from immunity for certain counterclaims brought against
a foreign sovereign.
Every suit alleging jurisdiction under the FSIA requires the
application of section 1605 or 1607. It was under section 1605 that
the district court dismissed the Verlinden case, holding that the
alleged anticipatory breach of the letter of credit was not based on
a commercial activity with sufficient direct effect in the United
States.4
8
If an exception to immunity is found, then section 1606 is acti-
vated. This section provides that "the foreign state shall be liable
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances. 4' 9 Under one of the tests applied by the
court of appeals, it found that no new cause of action was created
under this provision and that the suit could not, therefore, qualify
as "arising under" the laws of the United States.50 In contrast, ap-
pellants urged the Supreme Court to sustain the constitutionality
of the FSIA on the basis that this section created a federal cause of
action.
5 1
Section 1608 deals with the manner of service, time to answer
and default. The FSIA does not permit default judgment unless
the claimant establishes his right to relief by sufficient evidence.
Although the House Report on the FSIA stated that foreign sover-
eign immunity was to be raised as an affirmative defense, 2 a court
48. The district court held that no exception to the Act could be found upon which to
base jurisdiction for the suit against the Central Bank. All the activity under the contract
had taken place outside of the United States except for the confirming of the letter of credit
through the Morgan Bank in the United States. This was thought by the court not to have a
substantial enough direct effect in the United States to maintain jurisdiction. It further
noted that such a practice could have a negative effect on commercial trade in New York
since the mere act of confirming credit through one of its banks could subject a party to
jurisdiction in the United States.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. In addition, this section provides that no recovery for punitive
damages is permitted under the Act.
50. 647 F.2d at 326. The Court noted that the tests used by the court of appeals were
misapplied to the Act and were only relevant to claims based on section 1331, the general
federal question statute. 103 S. Ct. at 1972.
51. 103 S. Ct. at 1972, n. 22.
52. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17.
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would be compelled to apply the provisions of the act, even if the
party did not appear.53
Section 1609, symmetrical to section 1604, generally provides
that the property of a foreign state is immune from attachment
and execution except as provided under sections 1610 and 1611 or
by international agreement. Sections 1610 and 1611 permit attach-
ment and execution only under a narrow set of circumstances and
are generally more restrictive than required by international law.
5
4
Thus, it is apparant that any action brought under the FSIA
would require the application of several of its provisions as well as,
under certain circumstances, the interpretation of various interna-
tional agreements to determine whether suit could be brought
against the foreign sovereign.
Foreign Plaintiff May Sue Foreign Sovereign Under the FSIA
Against this background, the Supreme Court turned to the is-
sue of whether the FSIA, as written, would permit a foreign plain-
tiff (Verlinden) to sue a foreign sovereign (Central Bank) in the
courts of the United States. The Court found that the FSIA per-
mitted a foreign plaintiff to bring suit as long as the "substantive"
requirements of the act were met.55 In agreement with the district
court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found that on
its face the clear language of the Act permitted such a suit, since
the Act contained no limitations as to the citizenship of a plaintiff,
but rather broadly conferred jurisdiction over "any non-jury civil
action against a foreign state."" Looking to the legislative history
of the act as a whole, the Court found no intent by Congress to
limit access to the courts to American citizens only. The Court rea-
soned further that the requirements of "substantial contact"57 and
"direct effect in the United States"58 would prevent the courts
from becoming international courts of claims with unlimited
jurisdiction.
53. Id. at 1971, n. 20.
54. Weber supra note 30, at 22-23.
55. 103 S. Ct. at 1970.
56. Id. at 1969, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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Constitutionality of the FSIA
The Court in Verlinden then addressed the key issue in the
case: the constitutionality of the FSIA where jurisdiction is based
on the "arising under" clause" and where the rule of decision is to
be provided by non-federal law." The "arising under" clause
states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority. . .. "'
The dispute in Verlinden was to be governed by non-federal
law, relative to the anticipated breach of the letter of credit.2
Since no diversity existed between the parties,6a jurisdiction was
asserted as arising under a federal law, the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act. To sustain the constitutionality of the FSIA, under
the circumstances presented, there had to be some provision in the
Constitution upon which the grant of jurisdiction could be based .
4
In order to determine whether the cause of action presented in
the Verlinden case would properly lie within the original jurisdic-
tion of the district court based upon the "arising under" clause,
the Court reawakened the test established by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in 1824 in Osborn v. Bank of the United States."' The Os-
born test, which determines whether there is sufficient foundation
for jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause as quoted by the
Court, is: "[T]he title or right set up by the party may be defeated
by one construction of the constitution or laws of the United
States, and sustained by the opposite construction.""' According to
Osborn, the scope of article III is clear. Its powers are coextensive
with the powers of the other two branches of the government. This
is necessary so that the judiciary can be competent to give efficacy
to all of the laws passed by Congress. Likewise, the executive
59. The issue in this case is concerned with the proper scope of jurisdiction based di-
rectly on the Constitution under the "arising under" clause. Jurisdiction under the FSIA is
not based on the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
60. See supra note 8.
61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
62. See supra note 8.
63. The diversity clause has not been interpreted to be broad enough to confer jurisdic-
tion over actions by foreign plaintiffs, since a foreign plaintiff is not a "State, or [a] Citize[n]
thereof." 103 S. Ct. at 1970, citing Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall 12 (1800).
64. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1923).
65. 9 Wheat 738 (1824).
66. Id. at 822.
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branch would have equal power to execute all of the laws. e"
In Osborn, the United States Bank sought an injunction to
prohibit Osborn, a state auditor, from proceeding against the bank
to collect a tax for operating in the state contrary to its laws.
Under the federal charter creating the Bank, it was given the
power "to sue and be sued" in all state courts of competent juris-
diction and in any circuit court of the United States."8 This was
interpreted as the equivalent of conferring jurisdiction on the fed-
eral courts." In addition, the charter defined the duties of the
Bank. It was similarly contended in Osborn that the question
presented did not arise under the laws of the United States be-
cause the final determination depended on several general princi-
ples of state law and not any federal act of Congress.70 Marshall
applied his test and determined, to the contrary, that but for the
law creating the Bank and giving it the right to sue, the case never
would have existed.
According to Osborn, once the test was applied and a federal
issue found as an ingredient in the case, all other issues could be
decided as incidental to the federal jurisdiction. The Osborn Court
was concerned that to do otherwise could result in the federal
courts never having a whole case to decide, but only the particular
issue requiring the construction of the laws of the United States as
an insulated point on appeal.7 ' A further concern of the Osborn
Court was that the laws of the United States be interpreted and
applied uniformly.
Despite criticism leveled at the test applied in Osborn in re-
cent and past years as being overly broad, the Court in Verlinden
67. Id. at 818-19.
68. Id. at 817.
69. Id. at 817-18.
70. The opinion in Osborn proceeds to discuss in detail the situation that would be
presented if the Bank were asserting a claim under a state law contract action rather than
the right for the state to tax a federal entity, the Bank. This is so that it can decide all cases
in which the Bank might be involved. See discussion C. WRJGHT, LAW OF FinERuL COURTS §
17, 63-65 (3d ed. 1976). See companion case: Bank of the U.S. v. Planter's Bank of Georgia,
9 Wheat 904 (1824).
71. The reasoning in Osborn was further based on the principle that in any case where
original jurisdiction could be granted to the federal courts, appellate jurisdiction could also
be granted. In actuality, there appears to be a distinction between original and appellate
jurisdiction. If the adequate state grounds doctrine applied, for example, then the federal
courts would not be able to review the case even though there was a federal question con-




referenced Osborn as the controlling case regarding the proper
scope of article 3, "arising under" jurisdiction. Justice Johnson dis-
sented in the Osborn case on the grounds that the test was too
speculative-granting jurisdiction merely on the ground that a fed-
eral question might be raised-and feared that the jurisdiction of
the state courts would be invaded under such a test. Justice
Frankfurter, in the dissenting opinion of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,"' raised similar concerns. The court of appeals in
Verlinden discounted the opinion in Osborn as consisting of dic-
tum.7 1 It thought Osborn should be limited to its narrow facts,
based on the state of the nation at a time when the national bank
needed to be protected from the states. The Supreme Court
brushed aside such criticism, asserting that the question presented
in Verlinden did not merely present a possibility of involving a
federal law but fit squarely within the test: "[A] suit against a for-
eign state under this Act necessarily raises questions of federal law
at the very outset, and hence clearly 'arises under' federal law as
that term is used in article I1."17
Foreign Relations Power
Next, the Verlinden Court considered from what constitu-
tional source Congress derived the substantive power to enact the
FSIA. It found the source to be:
its powers to prescribe the jurisdiction of Federal courts, art. I, §
8, cl. 9; to define offenses against the 'Law of Nations,' art. I, § 8,
cl. 10; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, art. I, § 8, cl. 3;
and to make all laws necessary and proper to execute the Gov-
ernment's powers, art. I, § 8, cl. 18."'
The Court noted the undisputed power of Congress in the area of
foreign relations to regulate the circumstances under which a for-
eign sovereign may be amenable to suit in the United States. As a
72. 9 Wheat at 871-903. It is article 3 which is chiefly responsible for the allocation of
cases between the federal and state courts in our federalist system of government. Justice
Johnson did not necessarily find the majority opinion in Osborn beyond the scope of the
Constitution, but rather found that the consequences from such an interpretation would be
too great. At the same time, he indicated the possibility that the necessary and proper
clause had taken on greater powers than anticipated by the creators of the Constitution, but
that one branch of the government could not remodel the Constitution for another branch.
73. 353 U.S. 448, 460-546 (1957).
74. 647 F.2d at 329.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
76. Id. at 1962, n. 19.
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further argument of the strength of the federal law aspect of the
FSIA itself, the Court emphasized the very sensitive federal issues
raised by such regulation and cited Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino77 and Zschernig v. Miller.7
8
The situation presented in Sabbatino, prior to the enactment
of the FSIA, originated from a suit brought by a Cuban govern-
mental agency against a commodities broker for conversion of bills
of lading on a shipment of sugar. The Cuban government also
sought an injunction against Sabbatino, the temporary receiver for
the New York assests of C.A.V., a Cuban company owned by
American nationals, to prevent him from obtaining the proceeds of
the bills of lading. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was
whether a counterclaim by the defendants could be maintained
against the Cuban government for expropriation of the sugar from
its former owner, C.A.V., in view of the "act of state" doctrine."
The Sabbatino Court spoke of the very important and tran-
scending interest in national policy involved in the case. Justice
Harlan, who delivered the opinion, relied on a line of cases before
it which had interpreted the "act of state" doctrine: "[tihe rule
'does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a
case. . . . To accept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is
not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise
of it.' "80
The Sabbatino Court determined that the rule of decision, the
"act of state" doctrine, which governed the case was uniquely fed-
eral in nature.81 Although not required by the Constitution, Harlan
noted that the constitutional underpinnings for the "act of state"
doctrine arose out of the basic relationships between the branches
of the government in our system of separation of powers. "[W]e
are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a
77. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
78. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
79. The "act of state" doctrine precludes the courts from inquiring into the public acts
of a foreign sovereign, which it committed within its own territory. The policy reason behind
the doctrine is to prevent embarrassment to the executive branch. The Cuban government
had expropriated the sugar of certain listed companies in response to a reduction of sugar
quotas by President Eisenhower.
80. 376 U.S. at 418 (quoting Ricaud v. American Metal, 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918)).
81. The rule of decision announced in Sabbatino was that the Judicial branch would
not examine the validity of a taking of property committed within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign, where the foreign sovereign is recognized by the United States. This was
held even if the action of the foreign sovereign committed within its own territory was con-
trary to international law.
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basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judici-
ary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community must be treated ex-
clusively as an aspect of federal law.""2
The Sabbatino Court also indicated that the task of passing
on the validity of foreign acts of state involved delicate problems
which could hinder our country's goals or the goals of the commu-
nity of nations as a whole. The Sabbatino Court noted the problem
which could result if the federal and state courts were left to for-
mulate their own rules, e.g., decisions by state courts might be
based on parochial concerns. 8
In the other case relied on by the Court as establishing the
primacy of federal concerns in the area of foreign relations,
Zschernig v. Miller,8" an Oregon statute' stating conditions under
which an alien not residing in the United States could inherit
property was held to be an intrusion by the state into the field of
foreign relations. This was held even though the descent and dis-
tribution of property is peculiarly within the province of the
state.86 The Zschernig Court found that the statute required an
inquiry into the policy of a foreign nation for the purpose of deter-
mining whether that nation allowed a reciprocal right for United
States citizens to receive property and payments from its estates
and whether it allowed its citizens to receive the proceeds from
Oregon estates without confiscation. The Zschernig Court found
this to be an illegal inquiry. Although state courts could construe
laws regarding foreign nations, they could not interfere with inter-
national affairs and national foreign policy.' 7 The application of
the state statute was considered to be a judicial criticism of those
nations adhering to a more authoritarian basis of government than
that of the United States and affected international relations in a
"persistent and subtle way."'" Thus, Zschernig established the ex-
tent of the primacy of foreign relations as a federal issue which the
Supreme Court would protect."1
82. 376 U.S. at 425 (footnote omitted),
83. Id. at 425 relying on comments made by Judge Philip C. Jessup of the International
Court of Justice.
84. 389 U.S. 429.
85. ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1951).
86. 389 U.S. at 440-41.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 440.
89. The facts in this case may present an exceptional situation, but if regulations, even
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Viewed against the backdrop of these very sensitive federal in-
terests, the Court concluded that the FSIA took on the aspect of a
federal substantive statute. Additionally, it emphasized that every
case would require an application of the provisions of the act. e
Since Congress enacted the FSIA pursuant to its Constitutional
authority to regulate foreign relations it is differentiated from a
purely jurisdictional statute by the Court.
Statutory Federal Question Jurisdiction-The Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule
Before concluding, the Court discussed the wide variance of
the court of appeal's decision with its own. It attributed this vari-
ance to the substantial reliance by the court of appeals on cases
construing the statute granting general federal question jurisdic-
tion, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and its predecessors. Although section 1331
almost mirrors the words of the "arising under" clause, courts have
interpreted it less broadly than the constitutional clause.9' The
FSIA, however, grants jurisdiction based directly on the Constitu-
tional clause.92 Such reliance by the court of appeals led it to apply
the "well-pleaded complaint" rule in its determination of whether
a federal issue existed sufficient to maintain federal jurisdiction.2
The Verlinden Court cited Gulley v. First National Bank" to
explain the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Under this rule, a court
must determine whether a federal issue has been presented by ref-
erence to the plaintiff's complaint only. Even if it is apparent that
such an issue would be raised in the answer to the complaint or in
defendant's petition for removal, this would not be sufficient for
presenting a federal question. In addition, a court may not con-
sider any allegations in the complaint which go beyond a statement
of the plaintiff's cause of action, even if in anticipation of a proba-
in traditional areas of state power, interfere with the nation's foreign policy, according to
Zschernig, they would have to bow to federal policy.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 1971. See discussion of the operation of the provisions of the FSIA
supra pp. 7-11.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 1971-72. The court of appeals did recognize the distinction between
the "arising under" clause of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, it confused
the test to be applied in measuring the scope of the "arising under" clause with that of the
statute.
92. The "arising under" clause of the Constitution provides the appropriate basis for
the statutory grant of jurisdiction under the FSIA. 103 S. Ct. at 1970.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 1971-72.
94. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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ble defense.95 This rule, which originated in 1877 in Gold-Washing
& Water Co. v. Keyes,"' is still viable today. It is thought this rule
stemmed from the theory that unless a federal question was
presented in the complaint, the court would lack jurisdiction to
take any action in the case.9 7 As the court of appeals thought that
the question of foreign sovereign immunity arose as an affirmative
defense and viewed this rule applicable, it held that Verlinden's
complaint failed to disclose a need to interpret federal law."'
Gulley concerned a suit brought in state court by the Tax Col-
lector of Mississippi to recover overdue taxes from the First Na-
tional Bank in Meridian, which had assumed the debt under con-
tract. The defendant removed the case to federal court on the basis
that the right of the state to tax the shares of national banks was
granted by a federal statute.0e The Gulley Court held that no fed-
eral question was presented.
Justice Cardozo, in writing the Gulley opinion in 1936, listed
the numerous tests applied by the courts to determine jurisdiction
under the general statutes providing federal question jurisdiction.
The first test noted by the Gulley Court was that the right or im-
munity created by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States must be an essential element of the cause of action. In ac-
cordance with the Osborn test, it was required that the right or
immunity be such that it would be supported under one construc-
tion of the Constitution or laws and defeated under another. An-
other test enumerated by Cardozo further required that there be a
genuine and present controversy and not merely a conjectural one.
Thus, a number of limitations were engraphed onto the deter-
mination of a federal cause of action for purposes of statutory fed-
eral question jurisdiction. In general, these limitations were
adopted by the courts to prevent the federal courts from being
clogged with too many cases, especially cases involving insubstan-
tial federal questions."'0 In addition, the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule applied as a limitation, often making it difficult to determine
95. Id. at 112-13.
96. 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
97. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18, 69. (3d ed. 1976).
98. 103 S. Ct. 1972.
99. Removal was sought by the First National Bank on the ground that the suit was
one arising under the United States Constitution. Judicial Code 28, 28 U.S.C. § 71.
100. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts COL. L. REy.
157-96, describing the different treatments of the words "arising under," as varying accord-
ing to the instrument in which they appear.
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if a genuine and present controversy was presented for purposes of
statutory federal question jurisdiction." 1
Finally, Gulley relied on the test in Puerto Rico v. Russel &
Co., 0 2 which required that the nature of the cause of action and
not its source be considered.0 8 The Gulley Court denied the claim
by defendants to remove because it was improper to base statutory
federal question jurisdiction on a federal law, which was the source
of the authority of the state to tax the bank, since that law was too
remote and unimportant to the cause of action for back taxes. 0 4
Although the right to tax the bank could have been an ingredient
in the case under the Osborn criteria it was rejected for purposes
of statutory federal question jurisdiction.
Early tests interpreting federal question statutes were less re-
strictive than the later tests applied by the courts.'0 5 The Gulley
Court noted modern federal statutes enacted specifically to narrow
the scope of federal jurisdiction in certain instances, such as the
statute abolishing federal incorporation as a basis for jurisdiction
unless the United States holds more than one-half of the stock.""
In elegant prose, Cardozo noted the gloss which the courts have
systematically applied:
[Tihere has been a selective process which picks the substantial
causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside. As in
problems of causation, so here in the search for underlying law.
If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can
be discovered to have their source or their operative limits in
the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself
with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To
set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the dis-
tinction between controversies that are basic and those that are
collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that
are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that
compass by.' 07
The limitations cited in Gulley are not limitations on the con-
stitutional power of Congress to confer jurisdiction. The Verlinden
101. WEIGHT, supra note 97.
102. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
103. Id.
104. 299 U.S. at 116.
105. Id. at 113.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 118.
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Court relied on Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter'"a to clarify that
"arising under" jurisdiction under the Constitution is broader than
statutory federal question jurisdiction. In Shoshone, an adverse
suit was brought, based upon a federal statute, 0 e to determine
rightful possession of a mining claim. The federal statute provided
that adverse claimants of mining claims had the right to bring suit
in courts of competent jurisdiction to determine who had the land
patent.110 The Shoshone Court concluded that the federal statute
in question was itself not a jurisdictional one; the statute contained
no express grant of jurisdiction, either exclusive or concurrent, to
the federal courts. Jurisdiction, therefore, would have to be based
on either the diversity or general federal question statutes and
would have been subject to a $2,000 amount in controversy. "
The Shoshone Court noted that, by virtue of its article IV
power," 8 Congress had the right to regulate the disposition of pub-
lic property. Thus, article IV along with the "arising under" clause
of the Constitution gave Congress unlimited power to provide that
any controversy of a judicial nature concerning the disposition of
public lands be confined to the jurisdiction of the federal courts."'
"The question, therefore, is not one of the power of Congress, but
of its intent.1"" 4 The Shoshone Court rationalized that Congress
must not have deemed the matter of jurisdiction within the federal
courts essential to the administration of the land laws and left the
major portion to be determined by the state courts. In contrast,
the intent of the FSIA was to consolidate suits within the federal
courts to create and maintain a uniform standard."
Weighing heavily the intent of Congress, the Shoshone Court
concluded that the controversy presented by the complaint did not
108. 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
109. REv. STAT. 629, 25 STAT. 433, § 2326.
110. Id.
111. Because not every suit involving an adverse action would involve a construction of
a law of the United States, but would depend on state law or more frequently be merely a
question of fact, the Court in Shoshone held that an adverse suit is not in itself sufficient to
vest jurisdiction in the federal courts. 177 U.S. at 507-510.
112. Congress has the power under U.S. CONST., art. IV, §3, cl. 2, "to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States."
113. 177 U.S. at 506.
114. Id.
115. "'[I]n view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the
importance of developing a uniform body of law in this area,' H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 32,
the Act guarantees foreign states the right to remove any civil action from a state court to a
federal court, id." 103 S. Ct. at 1969.
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raise a federal issue sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the federal
courts under the federal question statute. It determined that not
every suit to enforce an adverse mining claim would involve a con-
struction of the law of the United States but would more probably
depend on state law or be merely a question of fact. It contrasted
the federal mining statute as a basis for jurisdiction with a federal
statute incorporating an entity, such as in Osborn, which would in-
volve a construction of a law of the United States in every case;
i.e., whether the corporation had acted within the scope of its au-
thority under the incorporating statute. As the Shoshone Court
stated:
A statute authorizing an action to establish a right is very differ-
ent from one which creates a right to be established. An action
brought under the one may involve no controversy as to the
scope and effect of the statute, while in the other case it neces-
sarily involves such a controversy, for the thing to be decided is
the extent of the right given by the statute. 1"
The FSIA: Jurisdictional vs. Regulatory Statute?
The Court went on to contrast jurisdictional statutes, which
do nothing more than confer jurisdiction over a class of suits,
'117
with that of the FSIA. The FSIA was considered to be more than a
jurisdictional statute in that it sought to regulate under its foreign
commerce power and other specific article I powers."1 " The Court
pointed to The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Henry Fitzhugh'
case, in contrast to the Verlinden case, as presenting an example
of a purely jurisdictional statute concerned only with the access to
the courts of a class of suits. Propeller Genesee involved a tort
claim for damages from a collision on Lake Ontario, brought by the
owner of a vessel against the owner and master of the Propeller
Genesee Chief. The suit was brought in the District Court for the
Northern District of New York pursuant to the Act of February 26,
1845,12- permitting jurisdiction for certain cases occurring on lakes
and navigable waters. A threshold issue in the case was the consti-
116. 177 U.S. at 510.
117. The Court noted that the court of appeals had apparently concluded that a juris-
dictional statute could never constitute the federal law under which an action arose through
its examination of such statutes. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
119. 12 Hon. 443 (1852).
120. 5 Stat. 726.
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tutionality of the federal statute. It was thought that the grant by
the statute of jurisdiction to the district courts could not be upheld
under the admiralty clause of article III of the Constitution 2 1 be-
cause that clause had only been applied to vessels on the high seas
or tide waters." Therefore, it was urged that the statute was sup-
ported as an exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.
On appeal, the Propeller Genesee Court held that no regula-
tions of commerce nor any provision relating to shipping or naviga-
tion were contained in the statute. The statute merely extended
jurisdiction in all cases of contract or torts concerning steamboats
or other vessels greater than 20 tons, licensed for the coasting
trade and employed in the business of commerce and navigation
between ports in different states or territories.12 The statute fur-
ther provided that jurisdiction was limited to cases, at the time of
the passage of the act, which would have been under the admiralty
jurisdiction had the vessel been on the high seas. The statute
would have to be interpreted, in each case, to determine whether
the particular vessel qualified for jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Propeller Genesee Court could find no intent to regulate com-
merce on the part of Congress, and declined to uphold the validity
of the statute because jurisdiction did not arise under any proper
regulation, pursuant to the commerce power. 24 Not considered by
the Propeller Genesee Court was whether the jurisdictional
scheme itself would serve to promote any federal interests under
the commerce clause.
Contrasting the statute presented in that case with the FSIA,
the Verlinden Court noted that the intent in enacting the FSIA
was to provide comprehensive rules to govern foreign sovereign im-
munity. It considered the jurisdictional aspects of FSIA to be a
part of that "comprehensive scheme." 2' For support of the princi-
ple that foreign sovereign immunity represented a body of sub-
stantive law, the Court turned to two cases, which it had cited ear-
121. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides "The judicial Power shall extend. . to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."
122. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court in Propeller Genesee did uphold the ju-
risdictional grant under the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution, concluding that the lakes
and waters connecting them were public waters within the jurisdictional grant of that Con-
stitutional clause.
123. 12 How. at 451-52.
124. Id.
125. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
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lier in its opinion: Ex parte Peru"' and Mexico v. Hoffman.127
Hoffman determined that the standard to be adhered to by
the judiciary in deciding whether to grant immunity to a sovereign
was that the decision must be rendered in conformity with the
principles established by the State Department, which was charged
by the Constitution with the conduct of foreign affairs. The Hoff-
man Court noted that, in order to render its decision, it would
have to determine, for example, the character of a vessel and its
operation. The Hoffman Court considered a decision concerning
immunity to be very important: "Every judicial action exercising
or relinquishing jurisdiction over ... a foreign government has its
effect upon our relations with that government.' 28 Likewise, the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Peru29 noted that such an exercise of
jurisdiction could be a threat to the dignity of a foreign nation,
effecting our foreign relations with that nation.
Thus, the Verlinden Court concluded that the scheme of the
FSIA, channeling cases away from the state courts and into the
federal courts, in order to achieve a uniform standard, was an as-
pect of substantive federal law based on Congress's foreign rela-
tions and foreign commerce powers.180
The Court also contrasted the FSIA with the purely jurisdic-
tional statute in Mossman v. Higginson, 81 which conferred juris-
diction on federal courts over actions "where an alien is a
party." 2 The statute was found to be beyond the scope of Article
III, both in regard to diversity jurisdiction and "arising under" ju-
risdiction, where there was an action by one alien against another
alien. The problem with that statute in contrast to FSIA was that
it did not regulate.13
Application of the Osborn Test
The Court ended its opinion by applying the Osborn test to
Verlinden. If the Court were to determine that none of the excep-
126. 318 U.S. at 578.
127. 324 U.S. at 30.
128. Id. at 35.
129. 318 U.S. at 578.
130. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
131. 4 Dall. 12 (1800).
132. Id.
133. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
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tions34 to immunity under the FSIA were met, then the plaintiff
would not have the right to bring suit in any court in the United
States. Under an opposite construction of the FSIA, the suit would
lie. The Court concluded that: "The resulting jurisdictional grant
is within the bounds of article III, since every action against a for-
eign sovereign necessarily involves application of a body of sub-
stantive federal law, and accordingly 'arises under' federal law,
within the meaning of article III.'' 8
The case was then remanded by the Supreme Court to the
Court of Appeals to determine whether an exception to immunity
could be found to satisfy the substantive requirements of the FSIA
so that Verlinden could proceed with the action.
Protective Jurisdiction
In a footnote to its opinion, the Court maintained that the
constitutionality of the FSIA could be easily demonstrated and
that no such considerations of "protective jurisdiction" theories
were necessary. ' * "Protective jurisdiction" may be defined as that
theory which permits jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause
of the Constitution based on a jurisdictional statute alone, if that
statute protects a significant federal interest. In general, the signif-
icant federal interest must be in strong need of protection.1 87 Such
interests may vary and are thought to include forum-based inter-
ests where there is a special need for uniformity of decision and a
uniform application of procedural rules, and where states may
render parochial and partial decisions.1 8e The theory may even ap-
ply where there is a need to confer jurisdiction so that the courts
may develop an area of judicially created federal common law.1 ,
The "arising under" clause provides jurisdiction where a case
is governed by substantive federal law. However, a primary pur-
pose of the establishment of federal jurisdiction in the Constitu-
tion was for the protection of congressionally-created interests or
134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607. See discussion supra pp. 7-11.
135. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
136. 103 S. Ct. at 1970, n. 17.
137. Protective jurisdiction would be applicable where the rule of decision is to be
based on state or other nonfederal law. See Rosenberg, The Theory of Protective Jurisdic-
tion, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 933-1025 (1982); See also Wright, supra note 93, §20, 77-79.




other federal interests.1 40 Thus, it is possible that theories of "pro-
tective jurisdiction" may be constitutionally sound.
Proponents of "protective jurisdiction" vary as to its correct
scope."' Some commentators would allow such jurisdiction where
any interest is involved which could have been regulated under an
Article I power by Congress,"" while others require that there be
"an articulated and active federal policy" before the Article I
power is appropriate to confer jurisdiction. ' "
Ironically, the principal case relied on by the Verlinden Court
is the case which is most often credited with establishing the the-
ory of protective jurisdiction, Osborn v. Bank of the United
States.14 4 In that case, Congress had articulated a policy of estab-
lishing a federal banking system. In order to protect its newly
formed banks from antagonistic state court decisions, it was neces-
sary to provide a federal forum. However, a further requirement in
the Osborn test was that a federal law be an original ingredient in
the suit. The original ingredient in Osborn was the bank's very ex-
istence as a creature of federal law.' Although not discussed by
the Court, jurisdiction in Verlinden could also have been sustained
under a theory of protective jurisdiction.
The FSIA was prompted by the need to provide for uniform
standards in the determination of foreign sovereign immunity. Al-
though jurisdiction in the federal courts is not exclusive under the
Act, the broad removal provision steers cases out of the state
courts so that local interests and prejudices can be avoided. This
scheme promotes a significant federal interest: the favorable main-
tenance of our foreign relations and foreign commerce under Arti-
cle I. Such an interest, based on the analysis in Sabbatino and
Zschernig, would be great enough to allow for federal jurisdiction
140. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 844-850 (2d ed. 1973).
141. "[C]ourts Were thought of as indispensible instruments for the vindication of na-
tional authority." Id. at 6, n.19.
142. Professor Wechsler would allow a grant of "protective jurisdiction" wherever Con-
gress has substantive legislative power. Wright, supra note 93, §20, n.2. See Wechsler Fed-
eral Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROS. 216,
224-25 (1948).
143. Professor Mishkin would limit such jurisdiction to those areas of the law where
Congress has an articulated and active policy regulating a field. Wright, supra note 93, §20,
n.2. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" Jurisdiction of the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157, 184-96 (1953).
144. 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
145. Id. at 822-28.
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under a theory of "protective jurisdiction."
Support for the application of such a theory can be found in
the cases of Schumacher v. Beeler1" and the Williams v. Aus-
trian,14 7 which were not cited by the Verlinden Court in its opin-
ion. Schumacher concerned the interpretation of section 23(b) of
the Bankruptcy Act." 8 The District Court in Schumacher had dis-
missed a suit brought by a trustee in bankruptcy against a sheriff
to enjoin the sale of property, executed on by the State, for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court in Schumacher held:
"[C]ongress, by virtue of its constitutional authority over bank-
ruptcies, could confer or withhold jurisdiction to entertain such
[trustee] suits149 and could prescribe the conditions upon which
the federal courts should have jurisdiction."
150
Thirteen years later, in 1947, in the Austrian case, the Court
assumed without discussion that Congress had the power to confer
jurisdiction in a trustee suit, based on its article I bankruptcy
power, and without the usual article III grounds for federal juris-
diction. Austrian involved a suit by the reorganization trustee
against certain officers and directors alleged to have conspired to
misappropriate assets of a corporation prior to its reorganization.
State law governed the disposition of both the Schumacher and
Austrian cases.
While federal jurisdiction could serve the uniform and efficient
development of bankruptcy matters, state courts are consequently
deprived of their jurisdiction.' In regard to this expansion, the
Austrian Court noted, however, that it must bring about Congres-
sional policy without comment as to the advisability of the action
taken by Congress. "Judicial drives to limit the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts should not lead to decision falling short of complete
146. 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
147. 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 46 (a), (b). Section 23(a) provides: "The United States district courts
shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants concerning the
property acquired or claimed by the trustees ......
Pursuant to section 23(b), trustee suits are to be brought in the court where the bank-
rupt might have brought them had no bankruptcy proceeding been brought unless consent
were given by the adverse party or in the case of certain exceptions relating to fraudulent
transfers and voidable preferences under sections 60(b), 67(e) and 70(e).
149. These trustee suits were undisputably governed by state law.
150. 293 U.S. at 374.
151. See dissenting opinion, 331 U.S. at 662-68.
1984]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
effectuation of statutory scheme."1' "
In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., " -' a split court rejected the theory that article I itself could
empower Congress to confer jurisdiction on courts beyond the lim-
its imposed by article III. "Protective jurisdiction," being a more
subtle theory, seeks to sustain jurisdiction within the limits of arti-
cle III.154 A chief criticism of this theory, however, came from Jus-
tice Frankfurter:
The theory must have as its sole justification a belief in the in-
adequacy of state tribunals in determining state law. The Con-
stitution reflects such a belief in the specific situation within
which the Diversity Clause was confined. The intention to rem-
edy such supposed defects was exhausted in this provision of Ar-
ticle III." '
Federal Common Law
In Verlinden, a more conservative approach than that of "pro-
tective jurisdiction" for sustaining jurisdiction could have been the
Court's adoption of federal common law. A case arising under fed-
eral common law is one arising under the laws of the United States
and presents a true federal question.15 ' The instances in which fed-
eral common law have been created are, however, few and
restricted.
15 7
Known for its adoption of federal common law, Clearfield
Trust Co. v. U.S.1"5 concerned a suit brought by the United States
to recover payment on a forged check drawn on the Treasurer of
the United States. The Clearfield Court noted that because the is-
suance of commercial paper by the United States was on a vast
scale, the application of state law would result in exceptional un-
certainty, "making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of
the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule
152. Id. at 662.
153. 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The case concerned the validity of a statute permitting citi-
zens of the District of Columbia to bring suit in the federal courts against citizens of a state.
154. Wright, supra note 93, at §20, 77.
155. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 474-
75 (1957).
156. WRIGHT, supra note 97, at §60, 282.
157. Id. at 283.




In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala-
bama,1' 0 the Supreme Court also held that in the area of collective
bargaining contracts, courts may fashion common law. Although
the Court in that case was faced with the problem of whether sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947161 was a
purely jurisdictional statute, it interpreted the statute as an au-
thorization to adopt federal common law.
Likewise, the Court in Verlinden could have interpreted the
FSIA as presenting a similar mandate. In fact, the petitioners
urged that section 1606 of the Act, setting out a general rule that
the foreign sovereign is to be held "liable in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual,"'162 rendered every claim
under the Act a federal cause of action.'
Sabbatino is also recognized as allowing adoption of federal
common law in the area of foreign relations.'" The Court in that
case noted that federal common law may be adopted when it is
necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, the ultimate au-
thorization generally being derived from a statute.6 5 If section
1606 of the Act had been interpreted as a mandate to adopt fed-
eral common law, then the action brought by Verlinden for antici-
patory breach of the letter of credit would have been resolved
under principles of federal law and clearly would have "arisen
under" the Constitution.
Conclusion
It has always been particularly problematic to determine juris-
diction in a case where the cause of action appears to be deter-
mined by state law, but where some federal law is also an ingredi-
ent in the suit. The Court, presented with this problem in
Verlinden, applies the Osborn test. Under such a test, the scope of
jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause of article III is very
expansive. Whether jurisdiction can be maintained as a federal
159. 318 U.S. at 367.
160. 353 U.S. at 448.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
162. 28 U.S.C. §1606. See discussion supra, at p. 9.
163. 103 S. Ct. at 1972, n. 22.
164. BAToR, supra note 140, at 806-09.
165. 376 U.S. at 423-25.
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question under article III depends on whether the outcome would
vary based on the interpretation of the federal law. The Court's
application of the Osborn test fails because even with a purely ju-
risdictional statute, it is likely that a suit may be brought under
one construction of the statute and not under another construction
of the statute. Before applying the Osborn test, the Court goes to
lengths to label and determine that the FSIA is a substantive stat-
ute. Thus, although not a requirement of the test, the law relied on
must be substantive; a purely jurisdictional statute would be insuf-
ficient to base jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause of the
Constitution.
The Court in Verlinden was faced with a statute that on its
surface concerns access to the courts like any other jurisdictional
statute regulating the types of actions which may be brought in a
particular court. The Court had to pursue a course that was very
close to that it would have taken under a theory of "protective ju-
risdiction." The same factors which make the FSIA a substantive
statute would have also justified the application of a theory of
"protective jurisdiction." It is the peculiar need to provide a com-
prehensive scheme of jurisdiction in the federal courts which
makes the FSIA a regulatory statute under the foreign relations
power of the Constitution.
Verlinden may be a step toward the acceptance of the "pro-
tective jurisdiction" theory in the future. It is understandable that
the Court would be reluctant to sustain jurisdiction under such a
theory, which hypothetically could equip Congress with much
power and upset the distribution of cases between state and fed-
eral courts. A carefully circumscribed theory of "protective juris-
diction," however, would alleviate such concerns and could provide
a coherent and efficient basis for allowing jurisdiction in certain
circumstances where necessary to protect important federal inter-
ests. The Court also chose not to adopt federal common law as the
justification to sustain jurisdiction. This would have been an intru-
sion into traditional areas of state law, with the consequence that
every case concerning a foreign sovereign, regardless of the subject
matter of the suit, would than have been governed by federal law.
Instead, the Court in Verlinden maintained that the FSIA is a
substantive statute and sustained jurisdiction under standard the-
ories of "arising under" jurisdiction.
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